Although Cambodia had a rich and powerful past under the Hindu state of Funan and the Kingdom of Angkor, by the mid-19th century the country was on the verge of dissolution. After repeated requests for French assistance, a protectorate was established in 1863. By 1884, Cambodia was a virtual colony; soon after it was made part of the Indochina Union with Annam, Tonkin, Cochin-China, and Laos. France continued to control the country even after the start of World War II through its Vichy government. In 1945, the Japanese dissolved the colonial administration, and King Norodom Sihanouk declared an independent, anticolonial government under Prime Minister Son Ngoc Thanh in March 1945. This government was deposed by the Allies in October. Many of Son Ngoc Thanh's supporters escaped and continued to fight for independence as the Khmer Issarak. Although France recognized Cambodia as an autonomous kingdom within the French Union, the drive for total independence continued, resulting in a split between those who supported the political tactics of Sihanouk and those who supported the Khmer Issarak guerrilla movement. In January 1953, Sihanouk named his father as regent and went into self-imposed exile, refusing to return until Cambodia gained genuine independence. Sihanouk's actions hastened the French government's July 4, 1953 announcement of its readiness to perfect the independence and sovereignty of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Full independence came on November 9, 1953, but the situation remained uncertain until a 1954 conference was held in Geneva to settle the French-Indochina war. All participants, except the United States and the State of Vietnam, associated themselves (by voice) with the final declaration. The Cambodian delegation agreed to the neutrality of the three Indochinese states but insisted on a provision in the ceasefire agreement that left the Cambodian government free to call for outside military assistance should the Viet Minh or others threaten its territory. Neutrality was the central element of Cambodian foreign policy during the 1950s and 1960s. By the mid-1960s, parts of Cambodia's eastern provinces were serving as bases for North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong (NVA/VC) forces operating against South Vietnam, and the port of Sihanoukville was being used to supply them. As NVA/VC activity grew, the United States and South Vietnam became concerned, and in 1969, the United States began a series of air raids against NVA/VC base areas inside Cambodia. Throughout the 1960s, domestic politics polarized. Opposition grew within the middle class and among leftists including Paris-educated leaders such as Son Sen, Ieng Sary, and Saloth Sar (later known as Pol Pot), who led an insurgency under the clandestine Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). Sihanouk called these insurgents the Khmer Rouge, literally the "Red Khmer." But the 1966 national assembly elections showed a significant swing to the right, and Gen. Lon Nol formed a new government, which lasted until 1967. During 1968 and 1969, the insurgency worsened. In August 1969, Gen. Lon Nol formed a new government. Prince Sihanouk went abroad for medical treatment in January 1970.

In March 1970, Gen. Lon Nol deposed Prince Sihanouk and assumed power. Son Ngoc Thanh announced his support for the new government. On October 9, the Cambodian monarchy was abolished, and the country was renamed the Khmer Republic. Hanoi rejected the new republic's request for the withdrawal of NVA/VC troops and began to reinfiltrate some of the 2,000-4,000 Cambodians who had gone to North Vietnam in 1954. They became a cadre in the insurgency. The United States moved to provide material assistance to the new government's armed forces, which were engaged against both the Khmer Rouge insurgents and NVA/VC forces. In April 1970, US and South Vietnamese forces entered Cambodia in a campaign aimed at destroying NVA/VC base areas. Although a considerable quantity of equipment was seized or destroyed, NVA/VC forces proved elusive and moved deeper into Cambodia. NVA/VC units overran many Cambodian army positions while the Khmer Rouge expanded their smallscale attacks on lines of communication. The Khmer Republic's leadership was plagued by disunity among its three principal figures: Lon Nol, Sihanouk's cousin Sirik Matak, and National Assembly leader In Tam. Lon Nol remained in power in part because none of the others was prepared to take his place. In 1972, a constitution was adopted, a parliament elected, and Lon Nol became president. But disunity, the problems of transforming a 30,000-man army into a national combat force of more than 200,000 men, and spreading corruption weakened the civilian administration and army. The insurgency continued to grow, with supplies and military support provided by North Vietnam. But inside Cambodia, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary asserted their dominance over the Vietnamese-trained Communists, many of whom were purged. At the same time, the Khmer Rouge forces became stronger and more independent of their Vietnamese patrons. By 1973, the Khmer Rouge were fighting major battles against government forces on their own, and they controlled nearly 60% of Cambodia's territory and 25% of its population. The government made three unsuccessful attempts to enter into negotiations with the insurgents, but by 1974, the Khmer Rouge were operating as divisions, and virtually all NVA/VC combat forces had moved into South Vietnam. Lon Nol's control was reduced to small enclaves around the cities and main transportation routes. More than 2 million refugees from the war lived in Phnom Penh and other cities. On New Year's Day 1975, Communist troops launched an offensive which, in 117 days of the hardest fighting of the war, destroyed the Khmer Republic. Simultaneous attacks around the perimeter of Phnom Penh pinned down Republican forces, while other Khmer Rouge units overran fire bases controlling the vital lower Mekong resupply route. A US-funded airlift of ammunition and rice ended when Congress refused additional aid for Cambodia. Phnom Penh and other cities were subjected to daily rocket attacks causing thousands of civilian casualties. Phnom Penh surrendered on April 17--5 days after the US mission evacuated Cambodia.

Many Cambodians welcomed the arrival of peace, but the Khmer Rouge soon turned Cambodia--which it called Democratic Kampuchea (DK)--into a land of horror. Immediately after its victory, the new regime ordered the evacuation of all cities and towns, sending the entire urban population out into the countryside to till the land. Thousands starved or died of disease during the evacuation. Many of those forced to evacuate the cities were resettled in new villages, which lacked food, agricultural implements, and medical care. Many starved before the first harvest, and hunger and malnutrition--bordering on starvation--were constant during those years. Those who resisted or who questioned orders were immediately executed, as were most military and civilian leaders of the former regime who failed to disguise their pasts. Within the CPK, the Paris-educated leadership--Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Nuon Chea, and Son Sen--was in control. A new constitution in January 1976 established Democratic Kampuchea as a Communist People's Republic, and a 250-member Assembly of the Representatives of the People of Kampuchea (PRA) was selected in March to choose the collective leadership of a State Presidium, the chairman of which became the head of state. Prince Sihanouk resigned as head of state on April 4. On April 14, after its first session, the PRA announced that Khieu Samphan would chair the State Presidium for a 5-year term. It also picked a 15-member cabinet headed by Pol Pot as prime minister. Prince Sihanouk was put under virtual house arrest. The new government sought to restructure Cambodian society completely. Remnants of the old society were abolished and Buddhism suppressed. Agriculture was collectivized, and the surviving part of the industrial base was abandoned or placed under state control. Cambodia had neither a currency nor a banking system. The regime controlled every aspect of life and reduced everyone to the level of abject obedience through terror. Torture centers were established, and detailed records were kept of the thousands murdered there. Public executions of those considered unreliable or with links to the previous government were common. Few succeeded in escaping the military patrols and fleeing the country. Solid estimates of the numbers who died between 1975 and 1979 are not available, but it is likely that hundreds of thousands were brutally executed by the regime. Hundreds of thousands more died of starvation and disease (both under the Khmer Rouge and during the Vietnamese invasion in 1978). Estimates of the dead range from 1 to 3 million, out of a 1975 population estimated at 7.3 million. Democratic Kampuchea's relations with Vietnam and Thailand worsened rapidly as a result of border clashes and ideological differences. While Communist, the CPK was fiercely anti-Vietnamese, and most of its members who had lived in Vietnam were purged. Democratic Kampuchea established close ties with China, and the Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict became part of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, with Moscow backing Vietnam. Border clashes worsened when Democratic Kampuchea's military attacked villages in Vietnam. The regime broke relations with Hanoi in December 1977, protesting Vietnam's attempt to create an Indochina Federation. In mid-1978, Vietnamese forces invaded Cambodia, advancing about 30 miles before the arrival of the rainy season. In December 1978, Vietnam announced formation of the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation (KUFNS) under Heng Samrin, a former DK division commander. It was composed of Khmer Communists who had remained in Vietnam after 1975 and officials from the eastern sector--like Heng Samrin and Hun Sen--who had fled to Vietnam from Cambodia in 1978. In late December 1978, Vietnamese forces launched a full invasion of Cambodia, capturing Phnom Penh on January 7 and driving the remnants of Democratic Kampuchea's army westward toward Thailand.

On January 10, 1979, the Vietnamese installed Heng Samrin as head of state in the new People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). The Vietnamese army continued its pursuit of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge forces. At least 600,000 Cambodians displaced during the Pol Pot era and the Vietnamese invasion began streaming to the Thai border in search of refuge. The international community responded with a massive relief effort coordinated by the United States through UNICEF and the World Food Program. More than $400 million was provided between 1979 and 1982, of which the United States contributed nearly $100 million. At one point, more than 500,000 Cambodians were living along the Thai-Cambodian border and more than 100,000 in holding centers inside Thailand. Vietnam's occupation army of as many as 200,000 troops controlled the major population centers and most of the countryside from 1979 to September 1989. The Heng Samrin regime's 30,000 troops were plagued by poor morale and widespread desertion. Resistance to Vietnam's occupation continued, and there was some evidence that Heng Samrin's PRK forces provided logistic and moral support to the guerrillas. A large portion of the Khmer Rouge's military forces eluded Vietnamese troops and established themselves in remote regions. The non-Communist resistance, consisting of a number of groups which had been fighting the Khmer Rouge after 1975--including Lon Nol-era soldiers--coalesced in 1979-80 to form the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF), which pledged loyalty to former Prime Minister Son Sann, and Moulinaka (Movement pour la Liberation Nationale de Kampuchea), loyal to Prince Sihanouk. In 1979, Son Sann formed the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) to lead the political struggle for Cambodia's independence. Prince Sihanouk formed his own organization, FUNCINPEC, and its military arm, the Armee Nationale Sihanoukienne (ANS) in 1981. Warfare followed a wet season/dry season rhythm after 1980.The heavily-armed Vietnamese forces conducted offensive operations during the dry seasons, and the resistance forces held the initiative during the rainy seasons. In 1982, Vietnam launched a major offensive against the main Khmer Rouge base at Phnom Melai in the Cardamom Mountains. Vietnam switched its target to civilian camps near the Thai border in 1983, launching a series of massive assaults, backed by armor and heavy artillery, against camps belonging to all three resistance groups. Hundreds of civilians were injured in these attacks, and more than 80,000 were forced to flee to Thailand. Resistance military forces, however, were largely undamaged. In the 1984-85 dry season offensive, the Vietnamese again attacked base camps of all three resistance groups. Despite stiff resistance from the guerrillas, the Vietnamese succeeded in eliminating the camps in Cambodia and drove both the guerrillas and civilian refugees into neighboring Thailand. The Vietnamese concentrated on consolidating their gains during the 1985-86 dry season, including an attempt to seal guerrilla infiltration routes into the country by forcing Cambodian laborers to construct trench and wire fence obstacles and minefields along virtually the entire Thai-Cambodian border. Within Cambodia, Vietnam had only limited success in establishing its client Heng Samrin regime, which was dependent on Vietnamese advisors at all levels. Security in some rural areas was tenuous, and major transportation routes were subject to interdiction by resistance forces. The presence of Vietnamese throughout the country and their intrusion into nearly all aspects of Cambodian life alienated much of the populace. The settlement of Vietnamese nationals, both former residents and new immigrants, further exacerbated anti-Vietnamese sentiment. Reports of the numbers involved vary widely with some estimates as high as 1 million. By the end of this decade, Khmer nationalism began to reassert itself against the traditional Vietnamese enemy. In 1986, Hanoi claimed to have begun withdrawing part of its occupation forces. At the same time, Vietnam continued efforts to strengthen its client regime, the PRK, and its military arm, the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (KPRAF). These withdrawals continued over the next 2 years, although actual numbers were difficult to verify. Vietnam's proposal to withdraw its remaining occupation forces in 1989-90--the result of ongoing international pressure--forced the PRK to begin economic and constitutional reforms in an attempt to ensure future political dominance. In April 1989, Hanoi and Phnom Penh announced that final withdrawal would take place by the end of September 1989. The military organizations of Prince Sihanouk (ANS) and of former Prime Minister Son Sann (KPNLAF) underwent significant military improvement during the 1988-89 period and both expanded their presence in Cambodia's interior. These organizations provide a political alternative to the Vietnamese-supported People's Republic of Kampuchea [PRK] and the murderous Khmer Rouge. The last Vietnamese troops left Cambodia in September of 1989.

From July 30 to August 30, 1989, representatives of 18 countries, the four Cambodian parties, and the UN Secretary General met in Paris in an effort to negotiate a comprehensive settlement. They hoped to achieve those objectives seen as crucial to the future of post-occupation Cambodia: a verified withdrawal of the remaining Vietnamese occupation troops, the prevention of the return to power of the Khmer Rouge, and genuine self-determination for the Cambodian people. The Paris Conference on Cambodia was able to make some progress in such areas as the workings of an international control mechanism, the definition of international guarantees for Cambodia's independence and neutrality, plans for the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, the eventual reconstruction of the Cambodia economy, and cease-fire procedures. However, complete agreement among all parties on a comprehensive settlement remained elusive until August 28, 1990, when after eight months of negotiations, a framework for comprehensive political settlement was agreed upon. On October 23, 1991, the Paris Conference reconvened to sign a comprehensive settlement giving the UN full authority to supervise a ceasefire, repatriate the displaced Khmer along the border with Thailand, disarm and demobilize the factional armies, and to prepare the country for free and fair elections. Prince Sihanouk, President of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia (SNC), and other members of the SNC returned to Phnom Penh in November 1991, to begin the resettlement process in Cambodia. The UN Advance Mission for Cambodia (UNAMIC) was deployed at the same time to maintain liaison among the factions and begin demining operations to expedite the repatriation of approximately 370,000 Cambodians from Thailand. On March 16, 1992, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), under UNSYG Special Representative Yasushi Akashi and Lt. General John Sanderson, arrived in Cambodia to begin implementation of the UN Settlement Plan. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees began fullscale repatriation in March, 1992. UNTAC grew into a 22,000 strong civilian and military peacekeeping force to conduct free and fair elections for a constituent assembly. Over four million Cambodians (about 90% of eligible voters) participated in the May 1993 elections, although the Khmer Rouge or Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), whose forces were never actually disarmed or demobilized, barred some people from participating in the 10-15 percent of the country (holding six percent of the population) it controls. Prince Ranariddh's FUNCINPEC Party was the top vote recipient with 45.5% vote followed by Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party, respectively. FUNCINPEC then entered into a coalition with the other parties that had participated in the election. The parties represented in the 120-member Assembly proceeded to draft and approve a new Constitution, which was promulgated September 24. It established a multiparty liberal democracy in the framework of a constitutional monarchy, with the former Prince Sihanouk elevated to King. Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen became First and Second Prime Ministers, respectively, in the Royal Cambodian Government (RCG). In 1997, Hun Sen conducted a coup against FUNCINPEC, replacing Renariddh his own hand picked prime minister, Ung Hust. The CPP won a plurality in the 1998 election, but Prince Ranariddh contested the election. Subsequently, an agreement for power sharing was again reached in November between Hun Sen and Ranariddh. Pol Pot died in 1998, and the remaining Khmer Rouge troops were absorbed into Cambodian army. Given these signs of stability, Cambodia was admitted to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The protection of all Cambodians by the law is guaranteed by the 1981 Constitution, which declares that the state "recognizes and respects human rights" and that it protects "the honor, dignity and life of its citizens." In the mid-1980s, lawyers in the Ministry of Justice had published some legal texts and statutes, but by late 1987, it was not possible to verify the existence of a comprehensive criminal and civil code. Decree-laws promulgated in 1980 paid considerable attention to political offenses, and they prescribed five levels of punishment for such crimes. A first-level offense, such as aiding or abetting an individual known to be "a traitor to the revolution," was punishable by two to seven years' imprisonment. A second-level offense, such as subversion or economic sabotage, was punishable by imprisonment for between five and ten years. Third-level offenses, which included the crime of taking up arms against the state, were punishable by five to fifteen years' imprisonment. A fourth-level offense, defined as plotting to overthrow the state or committing "treason against the revolution," and punishable by ten to twenty years' imprisonment. Fifth-level offenses, which included compounded acts of sedition by individuals in positions of authority, acts of rebellion by insurgent leaders, and acts of spying by operatives who maintained espionage networks carried sentences of twenty years to life imprisonment and even the death penalty. A further decree-law, promulgated around 1983, also addressed crimes against the state, such as treason, but included common-law offenses, such as murder, rape, and theft. Penalties for political crimes generally remained the same as they were in the earlier law. For common-law crimes such as murder, however, offenders were subject to ten to twenty years' imprisonment; for aggravated assault, six months to ten years; for rape, two to five years; for rape followed by murder, twenty years to life with the possibility of a death sentence. People convicted of theft were subject to confinement for a period of six months to fifteen years. Former Khmer Rouge cadres who were convicted of outrageous crimes against humanity faced the death sentence. Such sentences, however, had to be approved by the Council of State. The power to arrest and to detain for political or for criminal offenses was quite widespread among government bodies. It extended from the agents of the Ministry of Interior to the People's Security Service and to the military units of the main, provincial, and local forces. Refugee and defector accounts indicate that suspicion rather than evidence frequently sufficed to cause the arrest of a suspect. A 1987 Amnesty International report stated that arrested individuals were denied information about the charges against them and were frequently imprisoned without trial. Detention routinely was followed by interrogation, accompanied by repeated beatings and by torture. In an effort to correct the most flagrant of these abuses, the government promulgated its decree-law of March 12, 1986. According to Amnesty International, this statute "codifies and modifies non-legislative instructions against torture, rules on search procedures and regulations concerning powers of arrest and length of detention for interrogation." Amnesty International further observed that this was "the first PRK law to address issues directly related to human rights in these areas." Accused persons were accorded relatively few constitutional safeguards. They had the right to a defense counsel, but they could represent themselves. Fragmentary information reaching Amnesty International demonstrated that individual guilt or innocence-- especially that relating to political crimes--was not decided on the basis of judicial proceedings, but was determined beforehand by the arresting authorities following interrogation. Guilty persons then were sentenced administratively without due process. In the few cases brought to trial, the court confined itself to ratifying the sentence already decided upon behind the scenes. Defendants who were dissatisfied with a court ruling theoretically had the right to appeal, but the procedures remained unclarified, and the role of the People's Supreme Court as the final arbiter of judicial decisions was unknown.

Crime and banditry are persistent problems in many areas of the country. The severe poverty in Cambodia has contributed to an increase in armed robberies and assaults, sometimes during daylight hours. A number of Americans have been robbed at gunpoint in Phnom Penh. Most individuals were robbed while riding on motorcycle taxis or cyclos (passenger-carrying bicycles) and generally after dark, but such incidents have occurred in broad daylight as well.

According to data reported by Cambodia to INTERPOL for year 2000, crime recorded in police statistics shows the crime rate for the grand total of recorded crimes in Cambodia to be 4,797 per 100,000 inhabitants in year 2000. For intentional homicides, the rate in year 2000 was 4.89 for Cambodia. For serious assaults, the rate was 10.00 for Cambodia. For sex offenses, the rate in 2000 was 1.91. For robberies, the rate was 11.62. No data were given for automobile theft or burglary. However, the rate for theft (all kinds) was 16.16 per 100,000.

Is difficult to find a country with such a varied history of its legal system. Cambodia's legal system is primarily a civil law mixture of French-influenced codes from the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) period, royal decrees, and acts of the legislature, with influences of customary law and remnants of Communist legal theory. There has also been an increasing influence of common law in recent years.

The National Police, an agency of the Ministry of Interior, have primary responsibility for internal security, but the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF), including the military police, also have domestic security responsibilities. Security forces are nominally under the control of civilian authorities, but in practice answer to persons within the CPP. The responsiveness of local police and military commanders to civilian authorities varies by location. During the 1980s, law enforcement was the responsibility of the minister of interior, who, as a member of the Council of Ministers, was charged by the Constitution "to protect the interests of the people, preserve security and public order and protect the legal rights and interests of the citizens." To carry out these functions, the ministry exercised control over its own corps of plainclothes police and over the People's Security Service. In the late 1980s, nothing was known publicly about the ministry's agents, except that they fulfilled countersubversion responsibilities and that they may have been advised by Vietnamese and by German Democratic Republic (East German) personnel. In 1987 the People's Security Service consisted of a plainclothes branch and a uniformed police force called the Nokorbal (civil police). Total personnel strength was undisclosed. Day-to-day administration of the entire organization was carried out by the deputy minister of interior, under whom People's Security Service staff functions were carried out by fifteen departments or bureaus. Some of these subministerial offices, such as the traffic and the criminal police bureaus, performed routine law-enforcement functions. Others rendered support services, such as internal administration and supply, and still others fulfilled countersubversion responsibilities. Among the latter were the political ideology bureau, which performed loyalty checks on party cadres; the political security bureau, which arrested persons suspected of political offenses; and an internal defense bureau, or unit, which investigated government ministries and offices.

In Phnom Penh itself, police were organized into seven precinct or ward offices, with an additional thirteen precincts in the greater capital area. In the mid-1980s, the chief of the Phnom Penh police served concurrently as the deputy minister of interior. The organizational functions of the capital police staff approximately replicated those of the Ministry of Interior at the national level. Observers identified fourteen different bureaus, dealing with political security, interrogation, political ideology, internal defense, clandestine investigations, case analysis, organization/appointments, supply, forensics/polytechnics, administration, statistical, defense police (embassy and government building security guards), firefighting, and traffic control. A defecting police official estimated that arrests in the capital for both political and criminal offenses averaged about 100 per month in the 1980s.

At the provincial level, police authority was vested in a chief of the People's Security Service who was responsible to the KUFNCD provincial committee and, through channels, to the Ministry of Interior. The police sought to maintain a physical presence at least as far down as the district level and, where possible, as far down as the commune level. Police officials in the countryside were responsible both to their local party and government committees and to law-enforcement authorities at the next higher echelon. In areas without a police presence, law-enforcement responsibilities devolved upon local party or government officials.

Police control of the population outside the cities was assisted by a pass system. Such passes were issued by local committees and were required for travel among villages, districts, and provinces. Frequent checkpoints by police and by military personnel along principal routes ensured compliance by travelers. Violators of the pass system were subjected to brief incarceration upon being apprehended and to heightened surveillance upon returning home. According to defectors, however, checkpoint personnel were susceptible to bribery.

Given this recent history of Cambodian policing, it is not surprising that human rights violations by them have occurred. There have been numerous allegations of beatings of prisoners in police custody, including one case in Prey Veng province in July 2000 in which police beat a prisoner to death. A domestic nongovernmental organization (NGO) reported that between January and October 15 prisoners died of disease while in custody. Police and military forces have continued to acquiesce in or fail to prevent mob violence against suspected criminals, which resulted in dozens of killings. In April 2000, a mob overpowered police and beat two alleged robbers in police custody to death. The Government never has prosecuted anyone for participation in such cases of mob violence, but a provincial court in Svay Rieng did begin an investigation into one such mob killing that occurred in 1999. The Constitution prohibits torture and physical abuse of prisoners; however, torture, beatings, and other forms of physical mistreatment of persons held in police or military custody continue to be a serious problem throughout the country. There have been credible reports that military and police officials used physical and psychological torture and severely beat criminal detainees, particularly during interrogation. The problem has been compounded by a climate of impunity, whereby police and security force perpetrators of torture and abuse frequently have been protected from prosecution or disciplinary action by local government authorities, despite some central government efforts to curtail or eliminate violations of prisoners' rights and to address problems of accountability.

The Constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the Government continues to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. A penal code drafted by the U.N. Transitional Authority for Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992 remains in effect, as does the 1993 Criminal Procedure Law. The Criminal Procedure Law provides adequate protection for criminal suspects; however, in practice the Government sometimes ignores these provisions. One NGO recorded 28 complaints of unlawful detention and arrest by police, military, or local government authorities between March and August 2000. The Government initiated a crackdown on the CFF in September during the course of which it arrested over 70 suspects, including dozens without arrest warrants, and detained and subsequently released dozens more. The Government held some suspects incommunicado and denied them access to lawyers for a period of time.

Although lengthy detention without charge is illegal, suspects often have been held by authorities for long periods before being charged or brought to trial or released. In August 2000 an NGO provided the Ministry of Justice with information about 120 persons in prolonged detention throughout the country. According to the UNHCHR, such prolonged detention largely was a result of a growing prison population and the limited capacity of the court system. Accused persons legally are entitled to a lawyer; however, in practice they often have limited access to legal representation. Prisoners routinely are held for several days before gaining access to a lawyer or family members, although the legal limit is 48 hours. Although there is a bail system, many prisoners, particularly those without legal representation, often have no opportunity to seek release on bail.

The court system consists of lower courts, an appeals court, and a Supreme Court. The Constitution also mandates a Constitutional Council, which is empowered to review the constitutionality of laws, and a Supreme Council of the Magistracy, which appoints, oversees, and disciplines judges. The composition of both of these bodies is viewed widely as biased toward the CPP. There is a separate military court system. Trials are public. Defendants have the right to be present and to consult with an attorney, to confront and question witnesses against them, and to present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf. However, trials typically are perfunctory, and extensive cross examination usually does not take place. In 1998 the introduction of newly trained lawyers, many of whom received supplemental training by NGO's, resulted in significant improvements for those defendants provided with counsel, including a reduced pretrial detention period and improved access to bail; however, there remained a critical shortage of trained lawyers in most parts of the country--especially outside Phnom Penh. Persons without the means to secure defense counsel often effectively are denied the right to a fair trial. Defendants are entitled by law to the presumption of innocence and the right of appeal. However, because of pervasive corruption, defendants often are expected to bribe the judge for a favorable verdict, thereby effectively eliminating the presumption of innocence. Citizens' rights to appeal sometimes are limited by the lack of transportation and other logistical difficulties in transferring prisoners from provincial prisons to the appeals court in Phnom Penh. Many appeals thus are heard in the absence of the defendant.

The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, the Government does not respect this provision in practice. The courts have been subject to influence and interference by the executive, and there is widespread corruption among judges, virtually none of whom received a living wage. A serious lack of resources and poor training contributed to corruption and inefficiency in the judicial branch, and in practice the Government does not ensure due process. For example, judges often have no legal training and often lack copies of the laws upon which they are expected to rule. As a result of these weaknesses, citizens often effectively have been denied a fair trial in jurisdictions without regular access to defense lawyers or international judicial assistance programs. The Judicial Reform Council established in 2000 has made no significant progress in fulfilling its mandate to develop and implement judicial reform measures. During the year 2000, the Supreme Council of the Magistracy disciplined 26 judges and prosecutors for misconduct, but none was removed from his position. The harshest penalties meted out have been the transfers of eight judges. In June the Supreme Council of the Magistracy nominated to the Appeals Court a former court president and a former prosecutor who had been suspended from their positions and investigated for accepting bribes in 1999. No information about the investigation was released.

Human rights groups continue to report that the Government demonstrates its control of the courts by ordering the rearrest of suspects released by the courts. In September 2000 the Prime Minister ordered the rearrest of an acquitted suspected rapist, on the ground that his release was irregular. Legal observers charge that the Supreme Council of the Magistracy is subject to political influence, and does not protect effectively the independence of the judiciary. The courts and police often pressure crime victims to accept small cash settlements from the accused instead of seeking prosecution. When a case was tried, a judge sometimes determined the verdict before the case was heard, often on the basis of a bribe paid by the accuser or the defendant. Sworn, written statements from witnesses and the accused usually have been the extent of evidence presented in trials. Statements by the accused sometimes have been coerced through beatings or threats from investigation officials, and illiterate defendants often have not been informed of the content of written confessions that they have been forced to sign. In cases involving military personnel, military officers often exert pressure on judges to have the defendant released without trial. Court delays or corrupt practices often allowed those accused of crimes to escape prosecution, leading to impunity for some government officials or members of their families who commit crimes. The courts prosecuted some members of the security forces for human rights abuses, but impunity for those who commit human rights abuses remained a problem. With some exceptions, national and local government officials continue to lack the political will and financial resources to act effectively against military or security officials suspected of human rights abuses.

The military court system suffers from deficiencies similar to those of the civilian court system. Moreover the legal distinction between the military and civil courts often is ignored in practice; several civilian persons arrested for crimes that appear to have no connection with military offenses have been detained for trial by the military court.

Individuals sentenced to imprisonment, as a result of administrative or judicial proceedings, have been incarcerated in one of a nationwide network of about 200 prisons. These installations have been administered by the Prison Directorate of the Ministry of Interior and by the People's Security Service. They have constituted a many tiered system extending from the national level to the local level. At the national level, the principal prison has been T-3, located in Phnom Penh. This institution was built in the early twentieth century, and it has served as a prison for every successive regime to hold power in Cambodia. The facilities were enlarged 8/3/02in 1979. In the mid-1980s, it held about 1,000 prisoners. Administration of T-3 was shared by the Ministry of Interior and by the Phnom Penh People's Security Service, which used the facility to confine some its own prisoners apprehended in the capital area. In addition to the T-3 central prison, two other national penal institutions, code-named T-4 and T-5, have been reported. Both functioned as labor camps, and they appeared not to be maximum security prisons. T-4, located on the outskirts of the capital, was administered by the Phnom Penh People's Security Service; T-5, in Kampong Cham, administered by the provincial People's Security Service. Overall responsibility for T-4 and for T-5 may have rested with the Bureau of Reform Offices of the Prison Directorate.

Each of Phnom Penh's twenty wards or precincts has had its own short-term confinement facility. The precincts, however, have had to transfer their prisoners after three days to the central People's Security Service headquarters for confinement in T-3. Away from the capital, independent municipalities (such as Kampong Saom), provinces, and districts all had their own jails and prisons. These facilities usually have been administered by the People's Security Service at the provincial level, and at lower lower echelons. One of the better known provincial prisons was TK-1 in Batdambang city; the installation was taxed to the utmost in its role as a detention facility for captured guerrillas, smugglers, border-crossers, and insurgent sympathizers, because of its location in an area of heavy resistance activity. The capacity and status of other provincial prisons could not be verified. Given the regime's lack of resources, conditions in all of them must have been spartan, if not appalling. In some of them, inmates have been taken out on work details to perform manual labor, such as brush-clearing, ditchdigging, or dike-construction; however, this may have been on an ad hoc, rather than on an institutionalized, basis. Prisoners who had served their sentences have been freed by a release order signed by People's Security Service or Ministry of Interior officials and have been permitted to return to their home areas. Former detainees kept their release papers on their persons or near at hand, as a safeguard against rearrest.

The law-enforcement apparatus in the PRK, like the armed forces, became more institutionalized as the decade of the 1980s progressed, but how well the two establishments coordinated to insure national security at all levels remained open to question. These establishments did represent, however, the institutional foundations laid down by the regime and by the ruling party in order to retain power, ensure ideological orthodoxy, and impart a measure of internal stability. In the turmoil of a war-ravaged country, the fact that these institutions had been created represented an accomplishment--human rights issues aside--for the government and for its Vietnamese mentors. In a broader sense, these institutions have been part of the sovereign nationhood that Cambodia was striving to regain while deferring uneasily, but pragmatically, to Vietnam.

Domestic and international NGO's report that violence against women, including domestic violence and rape, has been common. Although comprehensive statistics are not available, one local NGO reported 423 cases of domestic violence during the year 2000. A local human rights monitoring organization reported 141 cases of rape. Authorities normally declined to become involved in domestic disputes, and the victims frequently have been reluctant to issue formal complaints. The law prohibits rape and assault. Spousal rape and domestic abuse are not recognized as separate crimes. A case of spousal rape could be prosecuted as "causing injury" or "indecent assault," but women's groups report that such charges have been rare.

Prostitution is prohibited constitutionally; however, there is no specific legislation against it, and prostitution and trafficking in women have been serious problems. Although the Government devoted greater attention to the problem of trafficking during the year 2000 and initiated several prosecutions, it has not enforced effectively a 1996 law against the exploitation and sale of human beings. Despite sporadic crackdowns on brothel operators in Phnom Penh, prostitution continues to flourish. A survey by a local human rights NGO found that 40 percent of women and girls who work as prostitutes do so voluntarily, while 60 percent have been forced to work as prostitutes or have been deceived into prostitution. The NGO also estimated that there are up to 55,000 sex workers in the country. Sex tourism is a problem.

Child abuse was believed to be common, although there have been no statistics available. Poverty and domestic violence often drive children to live on the streets; domestic NGO's estimate there are more than 10,000 street children in Phnom Penh alone, who are easy targets for sexual abuse and exploitation. Although sexual intercourse with a minor person under the age of 15 is illegal, child prostitution and trafficking in children have been common. In July 1999, the Government adopted a 5-year plan against child sexual exploitation that emphasized prevention through information and protection through law enforcement. To combat sex tourism, during the year the Government prosecuted at least six cases in which foreigners have been charged with pornography violations or pedophilia.

The illegal purchase and sale of infants and children for adoption is a serious problem. There have been several documented cases in which individuals or organizations purchased infants or children from their natural parents, created fraudulent paper trails to document the children as orphans, and then earned substantial profits from fees or donations from unwitting adoptive families, including foreign families. Some of these children may end up being exploited. In some of these cases, the perpetrators encouraged women to give up their children under false pretenses, for example, by promising to care for the children temporarily but then refusing to return them. During the year, police arrested at least seven individuals in two separate cases involving orphans for adoption. The accused have been charged under the Trafficking Law.

The law prohibits trafficking in persons; however, trafficking was a serious problem. Enforcement of the Trafficking Law also was a problem. The country has been a source, destination, and transit country for trafficking in persons. The majority of trafficking takes place within the country, providing both adults and children for exploitation in the country's sex industry. The sex industry is estimated to employ from 80,000 to 100,000 sex workers, a sizable proportion of whom are victims of trafficking. The International Organization for Migration estimates that at least 3,000 women and girls from southern Vietnam have been trafficked to the country to work as prostitutes, with more than 15 percent being younger than 15 years of age. The ILO's IPEC Program reported in 1999 that more than 15 percent of female prostitutes in the country have been from 9 to 15 years of age, and that 78 percent of these girls have been Vietnamese; the remainder have been Cambodians. Women have been trafficked from European countries such as Moldova and Romania, as well, for purposes of prostitution. A UNICEF study reported that one-third of the country's prostitutes have been under age 18. Some Vietnamese women and girls are trafficked through the country for exploitation in the commercial sex trade in other Asian countries. One study estimated that 88,000 Cambodians work in Thailand as bonded laborers at any given time; many are exploited in the sex industry or, particularly among young boys, are employed as beggars. One NGO estimated that 30,000 women and girls have been trafficked to neighboring countries, especially Thailand. Women and children, especially those in rural areas, are the most likely to become victims of trafficking.

Surveys conducted by domestic NGO's in 1995 indicated that from 40 to 50 percent of young women who have been trafficked have been victimized by a relative or friend of the family, and have been offered money or promises of a better life. Poverty and ignorance in villages was a major factor in contributing to the trafficking problem. Young children, the majority of them girls, often are "pledged" as collateral for loans by desperately poor parents to brokers or middlemen; the child then is held responsible for repaying the loan and accumulated interest. In other cases, parents are tricked into believing the child will be given legitimate work in the city. There is also a problem with the illegal purchase and sale of infants and children. Sometimes this is for purpose of adoption, including by foreign couples, but some of these children may end up abused and exploited.

Given the lucrative nature of human trafficking and the widespread nature of the problem in the country, it is believed that organized crime groups, employment agencies, and marriage brokers all have some degree of involvement. In one area on the Thai border, a recent report estimated that as many as 100 traffickers have been carrying out operations.

In December 2000, the Government began a general crackdown on prostitution, which has made prostitutes even more vulnerable to intimidation, violence, theft, rape, and disease. Corruption is endemic in the country, and it is believed widely that law enforcement and other government officials receive bribes that facilitate the sex trade and human trafficking. There have been allegations that high-ranking law enforcement and government officials are involved actively in some forms of trafficking in persons. The Trafficking Law establishes a jail sentence of 15 to 20 years for any person convicted of trafficking in persons under the age of 15; however, the Government does not enforce the law effectively due in part to budget limitations and a lack of implementing regulations.

Cambodia has been a country serving as a possible location of money laundering. Narcotics-related corruption reportedly involves some in the government, military, and police. There is possible small-scale opium, heroin, and amphetamine production in Cambodia. Cambodia is a large producer of cannabis for the international market.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Internet research assisted by Christian Hernandez and Chris Nguyen