The Andean region probably has been inhabited for some 20,000 years. Beginning about the 2d century B.C., the Tiwanakan culture developed at the southern end of Lake Titicaca. This culture, centered around and named for the great city of Tiwanaku, developed advanced architectural and agricultural techniques before it disappeared around 1200 A.D., probably because of extended drought. Roughly contemporaneous with the Tiwanakan culture, the Moxos in the eastern lowlands and the Mollos north of present-day La Paz also developed advanced agricultural societies that had dissipated by the 13th century of our era. In about 1450, the Quechua-speaking Incas entered the area of modern highland Bolivia and added it to their empire. They controlled the area until the Spanish conquest in 1525.

During most of the Spanish colonial period, this territory was called "Upper Peru" or "Charcas" and was under the authority of the Viceroy of Lima. Local government came from the Audiencia de Charcas located in Chuquisaca (La Plata--modern Sucre). Bolivian silver mines produced much of the Spanish empire's wealth, and Potosi, site of the famed Cerro Rico--"Rich Mountain"--was, for many years, the largest city in the Western Hemisphere. As Spanish royal authority weakened during the Napoleonic wars, sentiment against colonial rule grew. Independence was proclaimed in 1809, but 16 years of struggle followed before the establishment of the republic, named for Simon Bolivar, on August 6, 1825.

Independence did not bring stability. For nearly 60 years, coups and short-lived constitutions dominated Bolivian politics. Bolivia's weakness was demonstrated during the War of the Pacific (1879-83), when it lost its seacoast and the adjoining rich nitrate fields to Chile.

An increase in the world price of silver brought Bolivia a measure of relative prosperity and political stability in the late 1800s. During the early part of the 20th century, tin replaced silver as the country's most important source of wealth. A succession of governments controlled by the economic and social elites followed laissez-faire capitalist policies through the first third of the century.

Living conditions of the indigenous peoples, who constituted most of the population, remained deplorable. Forced to work under primitive conditions in the mines and in nearly feudal status on large estates, they were denied access to education, economic opportunity, or political participation.

Bolivia's defeat by Paraguay in the Chaco War (1932-35) marked a turning point. Great loss of life and territory discredited the traditional ruling classes, while service in the army produced stirrings of political awareness among the indigenous people. From the end of the Chaco War until the 1952 revolution, the emergence of contending ideologies and the demands of new groups convulsed Bolivian politics.

The Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) emerged as a broadly based party. Denied its victory in the 1951 presidential elections, the MNR led the successful 1952 revolution. Under President Victor Paz Estenssoro, the MNR introduced universal adult suffrage, carried out a sweeping land reform, promoted rural education, and nationalized the country's largest tin mines.

Twelve years of tumultuous rule left the MNR divided. In 1964, a military junta overthrew President Paz Estenssoro at the outset of his third term. The 1969 death of President Rene Barrientos, a former member of the junta elected President in 1966, led to a succession of weak governments. Alarmed by public disorder, the military, the MNR, and others installed Col. (later General) Hugo Banzer Suarez as President in 1971. Banzer ruled with MNR support from 1971 to 1974. Then, impatient with schisms in the coalition, he replaced civilians with members of the armed forces and suspended political activities. The economy grew impressively during most of Banzer's presidency, but human rights violations and eventual fiscal crises undercut his support. He was forced to call elections in 1978, and Bolivia again entered a period of political turmoil.

Elections in 1978, 1979, and 1980 were inconclusive and marked by fraud. There were coups, counter-coups, and caretaker governments. In 1980, Gen. Luis Garcia Meza carried out a ruthless and violent coup. His government was notorious for human rights abuses, narcotics trafficking, and economic mismanagement. Later convicted in absentia for crimes, including murder, Garcia Meza was extradited from Brazil and began serving a 30-year sentence in 1995.

After a military rebellion forced out Garcia Meza in 1981, three other military governments in 14 months struggled with Bolivia's growing problems. Unrest forced the military to convoke the Congress elected in 1980 and allow it to choose a new chief executive. In October 1982--22 years after the end of his first term of office (1956-60)--Hernan Siles Zuazo again became President. Severe social tension, exacerbated by economic mismanagement and weak leadership, forced him to call early elections and relinquish power a year before the end of his constitutional term.

In the 1985 elections, the Nationalist Democratic Action Party (ADN) of Gen. Banzer won a plurality of the popular vote (33%), followed by former President Paz Estenssoro's MNR (30%) and former Vice President Jaime Paz Zamora's Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR, at 10%). But in the congressional run-off, the MIR sided with MNR, and Paz Estenssoro was chosen for the fourth time as president. When he took office in 1985, he faced a staggering economic crisis. Economic output and exports had been declining for several years. Hyperinflation had reached an annual rate of 24,000%. Social unrest, chronic strikes, and unchecked drug trafficking were widespread.

In 4 years, Paz Estenssoro's administration achieved economic and social stability. The military stayed out of politics, and all major political parties publicly and institutionally committed themselves to democracy. Human rights violations, which badly tainted some governments earlier in the decade, were not a problem. However, Paz Estenssoro's remarkable accomplishments were not won without sacrifice. The collapse of tin prices in October 1985, coming just as the government was moving to reassert its control of the mismanaged state mining enterprise, forced the government to lay off over 20,000 miners. The highly successful shock treatment that restored Bolivia's financial system also led to some unrest and temporary social dislocation.

Although the MNR list headed by Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada finished first in the 1989 elections (23%), no candidate received a majority of popular votes and so in accordance with the constitution, a congressional vote determined who would be president. The Patriotic Accord (AP) coalition between Gen. Banzer's ADN and Jaime Paz Zamora's MIR, the second- and third-place finishers (at 22.7% and 19.6%, respectively), won out. Paz Zamora assumed the presidency and the MIR took half the ministries. Banzer's center-right ADN took control of the National Political Council (CONAP) and the other ministries.

Paz Zamora was a moderate, center-left president whose political pragmatism in office outweighed his Marxist origins. Having seen the destructive hyperinflation of the Siles Zuazo Administration, he continued the neoliberal economic reforms begun by Paz Estenssoro. Paz Zamora took a fairly hard line against domestic terrorism, personally ordering the December 1990 attack on terrorists of the Nestor Paz Zamora Committee (CNPZ--named after his brother who died in the 1970 Teoponte insurgency) and authorizing the early 1992 crackdown against the Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army (EGTK).

Paz Zamora's government was less decisive against narcotics trafficking. It had a mixed record in confronting narco-traffickers and made little progress in confronting illegal coca cultivation. In the mid-1990s, Paz Zamora and his government were investigated by the Bolivian Congress for ties to narco-traffickers. The 1993 elections continued the tradition of open, honest elections and peaceful democratic transitions of power. The MNR defeated the ADN/MIR coalition by a 33% to 20% margin, and the MNR's Gonzalo "Goni" Sanchez de Lozada was selected as president by an MNR/MBL/UCS coalition in the Congress.

Sanchez de Lozada pursued an aggressive economic and social reform agenda. He relied heavily on successful entrepreneurs-turned-politicians like himself and on fellow veterans of the Paz Estenssoro administration (during which Sanchez de Lozada was Minister for Planning). The most dramatic change undertaken by the Sanchez de Lozada government was the "capitalization" program, under which investors, typically foreign, acquired 50% ownership and management control of public enterprises, such as the state oil corporation, telecommunications system, airlines, railroads, and electric utilities in return for agreed upon capital investments. The reforms and economic restructuring were strongly opposed by certain segments of society, which instigated frequent and sometimes violent protests, particularly in La Paz and the Chapare coca-growing region, from 1994 through 1996. The Sanchez de Lozada government pursued a policy of offering monetary compensation for voluntary eradication of illegal coca by its growers in the Chapare region. The policy produced little net reduction in coca, and in the mid-1990s Bolivia accounted for about one-third of the world's coca going into cocaine.

In the 1997 elections, Gen. Hugo Banzer, leader of the ADN, won 22% of the vote, while the MNR candidate won 18%. Gen. Banzer formed a coalition of the ADN, MIR, UCS, and CONDEPA parties which held a majority of seats in the Bolivian Congress. The Congress elected him as president and he was inaugurated on August 6, 1997.

The Banzer government basically continued the free market and privatization policies of its predecessor, and the relatively robust economic growth of the mid-1990s continued until about the third year of its term in office. After that, regional, global and domestic factors contributed to a decline in economic growth. Job creation remained limited throughout this period and the public perceived a significant amount of public sector corruption. Both factors contributed to increasing social protests during the second half of Banzer's term.

At the outset of his government, President Banzer launched a policy of using special police units to physically eradicate the illegal coca of the Chapare region. The policy produced a sudden and dramatic 4-year decline in Bolivia's illegal coca crop, to the point that Bolivia became a relatively small supplier of coca for cocaine. The MIR of Jaime Paz Zamora remained a coalition partner throughout the Banzer government, supporting this policy (called the Dignity Plan).

On August 6, 2001, Banzer resigned from office after being diagnosed with cancer. He died less than a year later. Banzer's U.S.-educated Vice President, Jorge Quiroga, completed the final year of the term. Quiroga was constitutionally prohibited from running for national office in 2002 but could do so in 2007.

In the June 2002 national elections, former President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (MNR) placed first with 22.5% of the vote, followed by illegal-coca agitator Evo Morales (Movement Toward Socialism, MAS) with 20.9%. Morales edged out populist candidate Manfred Reyes Villa of the New Republican Force (NFR) by just 700 votes nationwide, earning a spot in the congressional run-off against Sanchez de Lozada on August 4, 2002.

A July agreement between the MNR and the fourth-place MIR, which had again been led in the election by former president Paz Zamora, virtually ensured the election of Sanchez de Lozada in the congressional run-off, and on August 6 he was sworn in for the second time. The MNR platform featured three overarching objectives: economic reactivation (and job creation), anti-corruption, and social inclusion.

Bolivia, long one of the poorest and least developed Latin American countries, has made considerable progress toward the development of a market-oriented economy. Successes under President SANCHEZ DE LOZADA (1993-97) included the signing of a free trade agreement with Mexico and becoming an associate member of the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur), as well as the privatization of the state airline, telephone company, railroad, electric power company, and oil company. Growth slowed in 1999, in part due to tight government budget policies, which limited needed appropriations for anti-poverty programs, and the fallout from the Asian financial crisis. In 2000, major civil disturbances in April, and again in September and October, held down overall growth to 2.5%. Bolivia's GDP failed to grow in 2001 due to the global slowdown and laggard domestic activity. Growth is expected to pick up in 2002, but the fiscal deficit and debt burden will remain high.

Bolivia's 2001 gross domestic product (GDP) totaled $8.4 billion. Economic growth is about 1% a year and inflation expected to be between 3% and 4 % in 2002 (it was under 1% in 2001).

Since 1985, the Government of Bolivia has implemented a far-reaching program of macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform aimed at maintaining price stability, creating conditions for sustained growth, and alleviating poverty. A major reform of the customs service in recent years has significantly improved transparency in this area. The most important structural changes in the Bolivian economy have involved the capitalization of numerous public sector enterprises. (Capitalization in the Bolivian context is a form of privatization where investors acquire a 50% share and management control of public enterprises by agreeing to invest directly into the enterprise over several years rather than paying cash to the government).

Parallel legislative reforms have locked into place market-oriented policies, especially in the hydrocarbon and telecommunication sectors, that have encouraged private investment. Foreign investors are accorded national treatment, and foreign ownership of companies enjoys virtually no restrictions in Bolivia. While the capitalization program was successful in vastly boosting foreign direct investment (FDI) in Bolivia ($1.7 billion in stock during 1996-2002), FDI flows have subsided in recent years as investors complete their capitalization contract obligations.

In 1996, three units of the Bolivian state oil corporation (YPFB) involved in hydrocarbon exploration, production, and transportation were capitalized, facilitating the construction of a gas pipeline to Brazil. The government has a long-term sales agreement to sell natural gas to Brazil through 2019. The Brazil pipeline carried about 12 million cubic meters per day (cmd) in 2002. Bolivia has the second-largest natural gas reserves in South America, and its current domestic use and exports to Brazil account for just a small portion of its potential production. The government is in discussions with a consortium of foreign investors over plans to liquefy natural gas at a Pacific port (Chile or Peru) for export to the North American market. This $5 billion project would create significant royalties for Bolivia if implemented.

In April 2000, violent protests over plans to privatize the water utility in the city of Cochabamba led to nationwide disturbances. The government eventually cancelled the contract without compensation to the investors, returning the utility to public control. The foreign investors in this project continue to pursue an investment dispute case against Bolivia for its actions.

Bolivian exports were $1.36 billion in 2001, from a low of $652 million in 1991. Imports dropped slightly in 2001 to $1.72 billion. Bolivian tariffs are a uniformly low 10%, with capital equipment charged only 5%. Bolivia's trade deficit was $525 million in 2001.

Bolivia's trade with neighboring countries is growing, in part because of several regional preferential trade agreements it has negotiated. Bolivia is a member of the Andean Community and enjoys nominally free trade with other member countries (Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela). Bolivia began to implement an association agreement with MERCOSUR (Southern Cone Common Market) in March 1997. The agreement provides for the gradual creation of a free trade area covering at least 80% of the trade between the parties over a 10-year period, though economic crises in the region have derailed progress at integration. The U.S. Andean Trade Preference and Drug Enforcement Act (ATPDEA) allows numerous Bolivian products to enter the United States free of duty on a unilateral basis, including alpaca and llama products and, subject to a quota, cotton textiles.

The United States remains Bolivia's largest trading partner. In 2001, the United States exported $281 million of merchandise to Bolivia and imported $182 million. Bolivia's major exports to the United States are tin, gold, jewelry, and wood products. Its major imports from the United States are computers, vehicles, wheat, and machinery. A Bilateral Investment Treaty between the United States and Bolivia came into effect in 2001.

Agriculture accounts for roughly 15% of Bolivia's GDP. The amount of land cultivated by modern farming techniques is increasing rapidly in the Santa Cruz area, where weather allows for two crops a year. Soybeans are the major cash crop, sold into the Andean Community market. The extraction of minerals and hydrocarbons accounts for another 10% of GDP and manufacturing less than 17%.

The Government of Bolivia remains heavily dependent on foreign assistance to finance development projects. At the end of 2001, the government owed $4.4 billion to its foreign creditors, with $1.6 billion of this amount owed to other governments and most of the balance owed to multilateral development banks. Most payments to other governments have been rescheduled on several occasions since 1987 through the Paris Club mechanism. External creditors have been willing to do this because the Bolivian Government has generally achieved the monetary and fiscal targets set by IMF programs since 1987, though economic crises in recent years have undercut Bolivia's normally good track record. Rescheduling agreements granted by the Paris Club have allowed the individual creditor countries to apply very soft terms to the rescheduled debt. As a result, some countries have forgiven substantial amounts of Bolivia's bilateral debt. The U.S. Government reached an agreement at the Paris Club meeting in December 1995 that reduced by 67% Bolivia's existing debt stock. The Bolivian Government continues to pay its debts to the multilateral development banks on time Bolivia is a beneficiary of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Enhanced HIPC debt relief programs, which by agreement restricts Bolivia's access to new soft loans.

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. Roman Catholicism predominates, and the Constitution recognizes it as the official religion. The Roman Catholic Church receives support from the State (about 300 priests receive small stipends) and exercises a limited degree of political influence.

Non-Catholic religious organizations, including missionary groups, must register with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship and receive authorization for legal religious representation. There were 272 registered religious groups, which were mostly Protestant; at year's end, approximately 127 applications were pending. The only minority religions in the country that have encountered problems are Hari Krishna and the Unification Church. Hari Krishna followers had registered as an educational organization instead of as a religious organization. The Government had denied religious registration to Hari Krishna practitioners in the 1980's on the grounds of what the Government describes as nonfaith-based activities of the group and has not acted on a new application by the group initiated in 2000. The Government considers the previous decision to be valid and in force. However, Hari Krishna continues to operate with official standing as an educational organization. In 1999 the Unification Church complained of harassment by the Government; however, the Church is registered with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship as a religious organization, and there have been no further developments.

The crime rate in Bolivia is low compared to industrialized countries. An analysis was done using INTERPOL data for Bolivia. For purpose of comparison, data were drawn for the seven offenses used to compute the United States FBI's index of crime. Index offenses include murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. The combined total of these offenses constitutes the Index used for trend calculation purposes. Bolivia will be compared with Japan (country with a low crime rate) and USA (country with a high crime rate). According to the INTERPOL data, for murder, the rate in 2000 was 31.98 per 100,000 population for Bolivia, 1.10 for Japan, and 5.51 for USA. For rape, the rate in 2000 was 18.75 for Bolivia, compared with 1.78 for Japan and 32.05 for USA. For robbery, the rate in 2000 was 4.25 for Bolivia, 4.08 for Japan, and 144.92 for USA. For aggravated assault, the rate in 2000 was 61.64 for Bolivia, 23.78 for Japan, and 323.62 for USA. For burglary, the rate in 2000 was 0.39 for Bolivia, 233.60 for Japan, and 728.42 for USA. The rate of larceny for 2000 was 0.16 for Bolivia, 1401.26 for Japan, and 2475.27 for USA. The rate for all index offenses combined was 117.17 for Bolivia, compared with 1709.88 for Japan and 4123.97 for USA.

Between 1998 and 2000, according to INTERPOL data, the rate of murder increased from 28.63 to 31.98 per 100,000 population, an increase of 11.7%. The rate for rape decreased from 20.69 to 18.75, a decrease of 10%. The rate of robbery increased from 3.72 to 4.25, an increase of 14%. The rate for aggravated assault increased from 59.04 to 61.64, an increase of 4%. The rate for burglary decreased from 0.89 to 0.39, a decrease of 128%. The rate of larceny decreased from 0.20 to 0.16, a decrease of 25%. The rate of total index offenses increased from 113.17 to 117.17, an increase of 4%.

The constitutional mission of the national police is to preserve public order, protect society through its specialized agencies, and guarantee enforcement of the laws. The police are also responsible for protecting foreign diplomatic missions. The police do not deliberate or participate in partisan politics. The Constitution stipulates that the president of the republic is the commander in chief of the police forces. In this capacity, the president--acting through the minister of interior, migration, and justice--names the director general of the National Police Corps (Cuerpo de Policía Nacional), another name for the national police. In a national emergency, the president is empowered to administer directly the activities of the police corps. In time of international war, the police forces would be subordinate to the Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas-- FF.AA.) commander in chief and the Ministry of National Defense for the duration of the conflict. In that event, the Constitution requires that police activities be integrated with those of the army as though the police were reserve units called to active duty for the duration of hostilities. The director general, who may be a civilian but almost invariably has been a high-ranking career police officer (usually with colonel rank), normally exercises operational control.

The police corps, with at least 15,000 personnel in the late 1980s, consisted of the General Administration (Administración General) section; the 5,000-member paramilitary National Guard (Guardia Nacional), still referred to as the carabineers (Carabineros), which were reorganized in 1976; the Directorate of National Investigations (Dirección de Investigaciones Nacionales- -DIN), which cooperated with the International Police (Interpol); the Customs Police (Policía de Aduana); the Traffic Police (Policía de Tránsito); the National Highway Service (Servicio Nacional de Carreteras), which operated under the authority of the Ministry of Transport and Communications; the Fire Corps (Cuerpo de Bomberos), which was manned by police personnel; and the National Police Academy. All of these subordinate entities were separate administrative units within the director general's office. This office, which also served as national headquarters for all police and national guard activities, consisted of a command group, or Police General Command, which was established in the early 1980s, and a staff (Estado Mayor) made up of twelve numbered, conventionally established staff sections.

The National Police Corps was a centralized force, organized on a territorial basis. Each department had a police district subdivided into zones. Field elements of the National Police and National Guard were stationed in all sectors of the country and reported directly to the office of the director general in La Paz. Each department generally had one brigade (brigada) of carabineers, consisting of an urban and a rural force. Subordinate headquarters (also known as brigades), stationed in the capital of each of the nine departments, coordinated and supervised operations. Each brigade was divided into an urban command and a rural command. The urban command, at the departmental capital, operated the police stations and local jails and was also divided into patrol and criminal investigation sections.

Most corps personnel and units within a department were considered--regardless of their size, composition, mission, or station--to be part of the brigade in the area they served and were members of a single departmental unit. An exception was the city of La Paz, where two separate regiments of carabineers were kept under the direct control of the director general and the president. Other exceptions to the integral brigade organization were made in sections of the country where dependence on the regular departmental brigade forces was not deemed advisable or feasible. Two such areas--San Ignacio de Velasco in Santa Cruz Department and Tupiza in Potosí Department--had independent carabineer detachments in addition to the department brigades.

Certain departmental brigade personnel of the rural command were assigned to a series of frontier posts scattered at twenty-seven critical points along the borders and at river and lake ports of entry. They included Customs Police integral to the corps, as well as uniformed carabineers concerned with combating smuggling and other forms of illegal border crossing. The carabineers were also heavily involved in civic action in the more remote and less populated regions of the country. In an effort to improve its public relations, the police created the Department of Social Communication (Departamento de Comunicación Social) in the early 1980s.

Corps personnel were classified in three distinct groups: uniformed personnel (carabineers); technical and auxiliary personnel; and civilian police investigators and identification personnel. Ranks of uniformed personnel generally corresponded to those of the army. There were four general classifications--jefes (field officers), oficiales (company officers), clases (NCOs), and privates (tropas)--with a graded system of rank within each class. Uniformed personnel were promoted on the basis of annual examinations given when they attained the required time in grade, which was usually four years for all except captains and sergeants, who must spend five years in grade before becoming eligible for promotion. Classification of civilians was based on a nonmilitary two-category system composed of superiors (funcionarios superiores) and subalterns (funcionarios subalternos).

In the mid-1980s, approximately 80 percent of the National Police Corps were uniformed carabineers. The remaining 20 percent were civilian police investigators involved in crime detection, forensic science, administration, or logistics. Approximately half of the total uniformed personnel and 60 percent of the nonuniformed personnel of the police force were stationed in La Paz. The La Paz Departmental Police also had an Explosives Brigade (Brigada de Explosivos), which was subordinate to the Fire Corps. The 600-member Traffic Police administered traffic law. Only officers of this force normally carried sidearms. All motorcycle patrolmen were commissioned officers. The Feminine Police Brigade (Brigada Policial Femenina) served in an auxiliary or support capacity to the operational units. In addition to directing traffic, members of this brigade helped in police matters involving children and women.

All municipalities were entitled to raise local police forces to enforce local ordinances. Only La Paz, however, had established such a force, called the La Paz Municipal Police (Policía Municipal de La Paz). In the mid-1980s, this force numbered about 400 uniformed and 100 nonuniformed members, none of whom was armed. Their functions were limited to enforcing parking regulations and local bylaws. Most of the city of La Paz was under the jurisdiction of Police District No. 2, which consisted of five squadrons. Police District No. 3 was responsible for the sprawling shantytowns above the city known generally as El Alto. Police Regiment No. 4 exercised jurisdiction over the area south of La Paz.

The police are responsible for apprehending and arresting criminals, although a citizen may arrest an offender if caught in the act of committing a crime. The Judicial Police (Policía Judicial) is responsible for ascertaining and verifying crimes, collecting evidence, and delivering the suspects to the judges and tribunals for trial. The Traffic Police exercises functions of the Judicial Police in cases involving traffic accidents; authorities responsible for air, river, lake, and rail transport assume the same responsibility for cases involving their respective means of transport.

The Constitution requires that police have a court order to make an arrest. An individual detained by the police in a local jail must be charged or released within twenty-four hours, except during a state of siege, when authorities may detain persons for up to forty-eight hours before obtaining an arrest order. During the initial period, a judge must determine the legality of the detention. Prisoners are usually released if they are determined to have been detained illegally. After charging a detainee, the police notify the public prosecutor, who lodges a complaint before an investigating judge, who then assumes the case. An arrested suspect is presumed innocent until proven guilty and may consult a lawyer of his choice if charged with a crime. An individual charged with a crime may qualify to be released on bail, which is generally granted except in certain narcotics cases.

Today, the National Police have primary responsibility for internal security, but military forces can be called upon for help in critical situations, and this occurred during the year. The Judicial Technical Police (PTJ) conduct investigations for common crimes (cases that do not involve narcotics). The police provide security for coca eradication work crews in the Chapare region, a tropical area where illegal coca is grown. The Special Counternarcotics Force (FELCN), including the Mobile Rural Patrol Unit (UMOPAR), is dedicated to antinarcotics enforcement. Civilian authorities generally maintain effective control over the security forces; however, some members of these forces committed human rights abuses.

In 2001, there were no reports of politically motivated killings committed by government agents; however, 1 person died while in police custody, and security forces killed 11 protesters during violent demonstrations during the year.

On December 11, 2001, security forces and squatters clashed near Yapacani. Dozens of police and squatters reportedly were injured, and one civilian, Jose Luis Velazquez, was killed by a gunshot. Local police told the press that they were attacked while attempting to lift a blockade. A relative said Velazquez was not involved in the protests. On November 9, seven persons were killed in violent clashes between landless campesinos (peasants) and small landowners in Pananti near the southern Bolivian city of Yacuiba, in the Department of Tarija (bordering on Argentina). Another 20 persons were injured (mostly with bullet wounds); the authorities arrested 9 campesinos and 5 landowners. Police were searching for at least three others at year's end.

The Constitution prohibits torture, and the Government generally respects this provision; however, there were a number of allegations of torture, beatings, and abuse by members of the security forces.

In 2001, there were some instances of arbitrary arrest and detention. Arrests are carried out openly. The new Code of Criminal Procedures (CCP) requires an arrest warrant, and the police must inform the prosecutor of the arrest within 8 hours. The prosecutor within 16 hours then must have the detainee released under bail or ask a court to continue to hold the detainee in jail until trial. A detainee may not be held for more than 24 hours without court approval. However, there were credible reports that these legal safeguards were violated in some cases.

Denial of justice through prolonged detention remains a serious ongoing problem, although this began to change with the full implementation in May of the new CCP. The new CCP provides that a detainee cannot be held for longer than 18 months awaiting trial and sentencing. If the process is not completed in 18 months, the detainee may request his release by a judge. However, judicial corruption, a shortage of public defenders, inadequate case-tracking mechanisms, and complex criminal justice procedures keep persons incarcerated for months, or even years, before trial. The Constitution provides for judicial determination of the legality of detention. Prisoners are released if a judge rules detention illegal, but the process can take months. Prisoners may see a lawyer, but approximately 70 percent cannot afford legal counsel, and public defenders are overburdened.

The May report of the U.N. Committee Against Torture estimated that two-thirds of the prison population are waiting for the processing of their cases to be finished, an increase from 60 percent according to a report in 1998. An estimated 30 percent of those awaiting judgement in 1998 already had served what would have been the maximum sentence for the crime they were accused of committing.

The Government continued to address the problem of delay of justice by implementing the 1994 constitutional reforms to streamline the judicial system and by taking measures to correct other deficiencies as they come to light. In May 2000, provisions of the CCP replaced the release provisions of the Personal Recognizance Law, promulgated in 1996, which never were utilized effectively. Most prisoners still await either trial or sentencing, but under the CCP the courts are beginning to provide release on bail for some prisoners. Judges still have the authority to order preventive detention for suspects under arrest deemed to be a flight risk or for obstruction of justice. If a suspect is not detained, a judge still can order significant restrictions on a suspect's travel.

Children from 11 to 16 years of age can be detained indefinitely in children's centers for known or suspected offenses, or for their protection, simply on the orders of a social worker. There is no judicial review of such orders.

There were some instances of arbitrary arrest and detention. Arrests are carried out openly. The new CCP requires an arrest warrant, and the police must inform the prosecutor of the arrest within 8 hours. The prosecutor within 16 hours then must have the detainee released under bail or ask a court to continue to hold the detainee in jail until trial. A detainee may not be held for more than 24 hours without court approval. However, there were credible reports that these legal safeguards were violated in some cases.

Denial of justice through prolonged detention remains a serious ongoing problem, although this began to change with the full implementation in May of the new CCP. The new CCP provides that a detainee cannot be held for longer than 18 months awaiting trial and sentencing. If the process is not completed in 18 months, the detainee may request his release by a judge. However, judicial corruption, a shortage of public defenders, inadequate case-tracking mechanisms, and complex criminal justice procedures keep persons incarcerated for months, or even years, before trial. The Constitution provides for judicial determination of the legality of detention. Prisoners are released if a judge rules detention illegal, but the process can take months. Prisoners may see a lawyer, but approximately 70 percent cannot afford legal counsel, and public defenders are overburdened.

The May report of the U.N. Committee Against Torture estimated that two-thirds of the prison population are waiting for the processing of their cases to be finished, an increase from 60 percent according to a report in 1998. An estimated 30 percent of those awaiting judgement in 1998 already had served what would have been the maximum sentence for the crime they were accused of committing.

The Government continued to address the problem of delay of justice by implementing the 1994 constitutional reforms to streamline the judicial system and by taking measures to correct other deficiencies as they come to light. In May 2000, provisions of the CCP replaced the release provisions of the Personal Recognizance Law, promulgated in 1996, which never were utilized effectively. Most prisoners still await either trial or sentencing, but under the CCP the courts are beginning to provide release on bail for some prisoners. Judges still have the authority to order preventive detention for suspects under arrest deemed to be a flight risk or for obstruction of justice. If a suspect is not detained, a judge still can order significant restrictions on a suspect's travel.

Children from 11 to 16 years of age can be detained indefinitely in children's centers for known or suspected offenses, or for their protection, simply on the orders of a social worker. There is no judicial review of such orders.

The 1997 detention case of Waldo Albarracin, President of the Bolivian APDH, continued to move slowly through the judicial system. The authorities had yet to take any action regarding the four police officials accused of abducting Albarracin, although legal cases against two policemen were pending at year's end.

The Government does not use forced exile.

The legal system of Bolivia is based on Spanish law and the Napoleonic Code.

The judicial system is divided into upper and lower levels with effective power resting in the Supreme Court of Justice. The Supreme Court of Justice consists of a president and eleven ministros (justices) who serve in three chambers for civil, penal, and social and administrative matters. Justices are elected for ten-year terms by the Chamber of Deputies from a list proposed by the Senate, and they cannot be reelected. To become a justice, a person must be a Bolivian by birth, have been a judge for ten years, be a lawyer, and meet all the requirements to become a senator.

Under the Constitution of 1967, the Supreme Court of Justice has the power to determine the constitutionality of laws, decrees, and resolutions approved by the executive and legislative branches of government. Moreover, it serves as the arena for malfeasance trials of public officers, including the president, vice president, and ministers of state, for crimes committed while in office.

The Senate elects members of the superior district courts of justice from a list proposed by the Supreme Court of Justice. It also elects members of a complex set of national labor courts. Members of the superior district courts are elected for six years, whereas jueces de partido (lower-court, or sectional, judges) and instructores or jueces de instrucción (investigating judges) are elected to four-year terms but may be reelected. The nine superior district courts hear appeals in both civil and criminal matters from decisions rendered on the trial level by the courts in each department.

Juzgados de partido (civil and criminal trial courts) are established in departmental capitals and in towns and cities throughout Bolivia. The criminal sections have investigating judges who investigate and prepare criminal cases for trial when appropriate. These cases are tried by sectional judges. Commercial and civil matters on personal and property actions are heard by the civil sections of the trial courts.

A number of small claims courts are scattered throughout the country and are limited to actions involving personal and real property or personal actions. Larger claims may be submitted to the same court, but the parties have the right of appeal to the sectional judge.

At the bottom of the judicial system are the mayors' courts, which consist of local judgeships. The civil jurisdiction of these courts is limited to hearing small claims and, in the criminal field, chiefly to police and correctional matters.

Theoretically, the judiciary is an autonomous and independent institution with far-reaching powers. In reality, the judicial system remains highly politicized; its members often represent partisan viewpoints and agendas. Court membership still reflects political patronage. As a result, the administration of justice is held hostage to the whims of party politics. Because members often also represent departmental interests, a national legal culture has not been fully developed.

Owing to years of military rule, Bolivia's legal culture has stagnated. The closure of universities in the 1970s resulted in a declining system of legal education. Only in the late 1980s did the Bolivian legal system have access to developments in organization and theory that had taken place in other nations. In 1989 AID initiated a program to overhaul the system of the administration of justice. In the opinion of most observers, however, the near-term prospects for implementing any reforms appeared poor.

Of particular concern in the 1980s was the increasing influence exercised by the cocaine industry over judges and even justices of the Supreme Court of Justice. Because of their low salaries, members of the courts were susceptible to the offers of the large amounts of money by narcotics traffickers

In cases of penal action, the office of the Public Ministry is responsible for assembling the evidence and testimony and, with police assistance, studying the complaint, visiting the scene of the crime, and locating and interrogating witnesses. When the evidence, including depositions, is assembled, the investigating judge holds an open hearing before all interested parties. The public prosecutor makes an accusation and presents all witnesses and documents for the prosecution. Witnesses deliver their testimony as a continuous narrative, without being questioned directly or cross-examined. When the prosecution has finished, the judge interrogates the accused and receives depositions and statements from witnesses who may appear on behalf of the accused. Defendants have the right to an attorney, including a court-appointed defense attorney at public expense, if necessary, but a lawyer is not always provided because of a lack of funds and qualified attorneys. Defendants also have the right to confront witnesses, to present evidence, and to appeal a judicial decision. These rights generally are upheld in practice. Although the constitutional right of fair public trial is adhered to, long delays in the judicial system are common, according to the United States Department of State. Investigations, trials, and appeals procedures are so lengthy that some prisoners eventually serve more time than the maximum sentence for the crime for which they were charged. A United Nations (UN) agency agreed in early 1989 to provide assistance to improve the administration of justice in Bolivia.

The trial judge reviews the investigating judge's summary and makes one of several possible determinations, in consultation with the public prosecutor. The trial judge may decide that the indictment is unwarranted and dismiss the case, or the trial judge may remand the case to the investigating judge for trial and deposition, depending on the seriousness of the crime. The trial judge also acts as a court of second instance for actions taken by an investigating judge. If the trial judge concurs in the decision by a lower court, the action is ended; a judge who disagrees may direct a retrial. The judge also considers appeals from decisions of the lower courts. If the trial judge decides to hear a new case, the proceedings are generally similar to those in the lower court, but there are some important differences. For example, the defendant must be represented by an attorney, either his own or one appointed by the judge. Additional witnesses may be called--either for or against the defendant--if the judge feels that they may contribute to a better understanding of the case. The judge may also call on advisers when ready to study the data developed during the trial. Within three days after the trial's conclusion, the judge must confront the defendant and pronounce sentence. The district courts and the Supreme Court of Justice follow the same procedures for reviews and appeals.

Today, the judiciary is generally independent; however, corruption and inefficiency in the judicial system remain major problems. Poor pay and working conditions make judges and prosecutors susceptible to bribes.

The judicial system has three levels of courts: Trial court, superior court, and the Supreme Court or Constitutional Tribunal appellate review. The Supreme Court hears appeals in general, while the Constitutional Tribunal only hears appeals on constitutional issues.

With the full implementation in May, 2001, of the CCP, the criminal justice system changed from essentially a closed, written system to a system of transparent oral trials. The old, highly formal, and often corrupt judicial system made it difficult for poor, illiterate persons to have effective access to courts and legal redress. In addition, under the old system, inefficiency and delay could result in a lengthy judicial process or prolonged pretrial incarceration. The CCP specifically addresses this problem by requiring that no pretrial detention exceed 18 months. In cases in which a sentence has been issued, but the case is being appealed, the maximum period of detention is 24 months.

In March, 2001, the Government enacted a new Public Ministry Law to adapt the prosecutorial function of the judicial system to the requirements of the CCP. Under the new CCP, the prosecutor, instead of the judge, is in charge of the investigative stage of a case. The prosecutor instructs the police, from the perspective of a legal practitioner, as to what witness statements and evidence are needed to prosecute the case. Counternarcotics prosecutors lead the investigation of narcotics cases.

During the first stage, the prosecutor tries the case before a judge of instruction if it is a misdemeanor case (which carries a possible sentence of less than 4 years), or before sentencing courts that include three citizen judges (jurors) and two professional judges for felony cases (possible sentence of 4 years or more).

The superior court review is restricted to a review of the application of the law. Supreme Court review, the third stage, is restricted to cases involving exceptional circumstances. During the superior court and Supreme Court reviews, the courts may confirm, reduce, increase, or annul sentences, or provide alternatives not contemplated in lower courts.

Defendants have constitutional rights to a presumption of innocence, to remain silent, to have an attorney, to confront witnesses, to present evidence on their own behalf, to due process, and to appeal judicial decisions. In practice almost none of these rights have been protected systematically, although the implementation of the CCP has begun to alleviate some of the problems by facilitating more efficient investigations, transparent oral trials, and credible verdicts. The timely delivery of justice also has been aided by the introduction, with the assistance of an international donor, of a modern, computerized system for tracking cases in the investigative stage and in the courts.

The law provides for a defense attorney at public expense if needed; however, one is not always promptly available. In 2000 the Government hired 49 additional staff members to bolster rural public defense, achieving a total of approximately 167 public defenders, legal assistants, and social workers. The public defender program also provides information about human rights to citizens and seeks to involve public defenders in arrest cases at the earliest possible juncture to ensure that human rights and due process are honored. A program of mobile public defenders who can reach the more remote parts of the country has proven somewhat effective. However, public defenders remained overburdened.

The CCP also recognizes the conflict resolution traditions of indigenous communities, but not the imposition of the death penalty.

The Judicial Council oversees the disciplinary aspects of the judicial process and provides an impartial body to review the actions of judges. Its powers include the authority to conduct administrative investigations and to censure for malpractice judges at all levels found culpable of malfeasance. By early 1999, the Judicial Council had investigated numerous reports of judicial corruption, which led to the resignation or dismissal of more than 20 judges in Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, and La Paz. One of the dismissed superior court judges, who allegedly accepted bribes from narcotics traffickers, protested his dismissal to the Constitutional Tribunal. In October 1999, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the Judicial Council did not have the power to dismiss a superior court or higher level judge. The Tribunal ruled that the removal of such a judge from office requires a final judgment and sentence of conviction in a criminal case tried before the Supreme Court. The Tribunal's decision dealt a serious blow to the Judicial Council, weakening its role as a disciplinary body. Nevertheless, the Council retains its power to suspend without pay, for up to 13 months, judges against whom a criminal charge has been filed or against whom a disciplinary process has been initiated. At year's end, legislation was pending to give the Council the power to effect suspension of up to 3 years or specifically to establish the Council's power to dismiss judges found guilty of malpractice by the Council.

In February a counternarcotics prosecutor in Trinidad received death threats.

The military justice system generally is susceptible to senior-level influence and corruption and avoids making rulings that would cause embarrassment to the military. When a military member is accused of a crime related to his military service, the commander of the affected unit assigns an officer to conduct an inquiry and prepare a report of the findings. The results of the findings are forwarded to a judicial advisor, who usually is located at the division level. The advisor then recommends a finding of either innocence or guilt. For minor infractions, the advisor may recommend sanctions such as house arrest or loss of time-in-grade (which delays promotions and future assignments). For major infractions, the case is forwarded to a military court (the permanent tribunal for cases involving enlisted members and officers below the rank of general/admiral, and the supreme tribunal for generals/admirals and appeals of cases from the permanent tribunal). General officers head both tribunals. For the permanent tribunal, a judge-advocate of war (usually a civilian lawyer) reviews the findings of the advisor and may change the recommendations of the advisor. The permanent tribunal usually accepts the recommendations of the judge-advocate of war.

There were no reports of political prisoners.

In arriving at a verdict, the judge considers the nature of the crime committed and the existence of special circumstances surrounding the case before imposing a penalty or punishment. The judge must give special attention to the criminal's intent. Bolivia's Penal Code distinguishes clearly between felonies and misdemeanors. The former is committed voluntarily and in a spirit of malice; the latter, without malice. The Penal Code recognizes the following three types, or orders, of punishment that may be imposed on criminals, regardless of whether or not the offense was a felony or misdemeanor: corporal punishments that involve some form of restraint or restriction on the person of the offender, such as imprisonment; noncorporal punishments that call for nonphysical penalties, such as deprivation of a civil right, surveillance, bonding, or reprimand; and pecuniary punishments that exact a fine or other form of monetary payment.

Although the 1961 constitution abolished capital punishment, it was restored in October 1971 for terrorism, kidnapping, and crimes against government and security personnel. In 1973 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the constitutionality of Article 109, one of several state security provisions of the Penal Code that entered into force in 1973, which mandates the death penalty, by firing squad, for any Bolivian who takes up arms against the nation, joins its enemies, or collaborates with the enemy in the event of a foreign war. In 1981 the death penalty was extended to drug trafficking. A death sentence could not be carried out, however, until the president decided against commutation. The president could commute the death penalty in favor of the second most severe punishment, which was thirty years at hard labor, with no recourse to pardon or clemency.

Thirty years at hard labor was also mandated under Article 111 (espionage) and Article 118 (sabotage). Under Article 133, terrorist actions carried a penalty of two to ten years in prison or, in the event of the death or severe wounding of the victim, twenty to thirty years. Engaging in armed actions against the security and sovereignty of the state was punishable under Article 121 by a penalty of fifteen to thirty years in prison. Article 128 provided that any attempt against the life or security of the president or other high government officials would be punishable by five to ten years of prison. Article 17 established that the penalties for drug-related offenses would never exceed thirty years' imprisonment. Most other crimes did not carry a greater penalty than ten years' imprisonment. At the request of a condemned individual, a judge could also choose to suspend a sentence or grant a parole or conditional liberty.

Bolivia's Penal Code also included a statute of limitations. A severe criminal offense could not be prosecuted unless the offender was brought to justice within ten years of the date of its commission. Judicial pardon did not exist in the Bolivian penal system, but both the president and Congress had this power in certain limited circumstances. Both were authorized to declare amnesty for political offenses, and Congress was empowered to pardon offenders in either criminal or civil cases, provided that the Supreme Court of Justice concurred.

Bolivia had several penal institutions, including the San Pedro national penitentiary (known as Panóptico) in La Paz and one in each of the nine departments. Most departments had jails to accommodate local offenders whose crimes were serious enough to warrant long-term imprisonment. Other facilities included a correctional farm at Caranavi in the Yungas, a reformatory for women at La Paz, and three reformatories for juveniles, one at La Paz and two near Cochabamba. These institutions, with the exception of the juvenile reformatories, were under the general supervision of the Ministry of Interior, Migration, and Justice, which assigned detachments of carabineers to provide guard and security forces.

Conditions at the Caranavi correctional farm, where prisoners engaged in common work in the fields during the day, were better than in most penal institutions in Bolivia. Regulations there were strict, and prisoners were tightly secluded in their cells at night under enforced silence. Communication with the outside world was regulated closely, and families were rarely permitted to visit inmates. Nevertheless, by being close to the source of food supply, the Caranavi prisoners had better meals than did inmates in urban prisons. The Women's Reformatory at La Paz, with a capacity for only thirty women, had the best conditions of all institutions in the system. It was operated under contract by a Roman Catholic order of nuns.

According to the Department of State, in 1989 there continued to be occasional reports of abuse of prisoners and detainees by individual police and security officers, although the Constitution prohibits torture and the Siles Zuazo, Paz Estenssoro, and Paz Zamora governments neither condoned nor practiced such activity. According to evidence made public in late 1989, forty or more severely mistreated prisoners were reported to have died and been secretly buried in a clandestine cemetery at the Espejos Rehabilitation Farm in Santa Cruz Department. Police, prison, and security personnel were rarely tried and punished for cruelty toward or degrading treatment of detainees. Corruption, malnutrition, and unsanitary conditions were endemic in Bolivia's underfinanced prison system. Although reportedly built at a cost of US$600,000, Santa Cruz Department's new Public Prison (Cárcel Pública) for juvenile delinquents, renamed the Santa Cruz Young Men's Rehabilitation Center (Centro de Rehabilitación de Varones Santa Cruz), was the site of inmate sabotage in early 1989.

Currently, prison conditions are harsh. Prisons are overcrowded and in poor condition. With the exception of the maximum-security prison of Chonchocoro in El Alto, government authorities effectively only have control of the outer security perimeter of each prison. Inside prison walls, prisoners usually have free reign. Violence between prisoners and in some cases, the involvement of prison officials in violence against prisoners, are problems. Corruption is a problem among low-ranking and poorly paid guards and prison wardens. Detention centers, which are supposed to house the accused prior to the completion of their trials and sentencing (if convicted), also are overcrowded. Convicted criminals often are housed in detention centers on judge's orders because of overcrowding in the larger prisons.

According to the Director General of the Penal System in the Ministry of Government, as of June there were 7,165 prisoners in facilities designed to hold 4,700 prisoners. The majority of all prisoners were held for narcotics crimes. The Pardon and Extraordinary Freedom Jubilee 2000 Law, an amended version of which took effect in December 2000, has begun to reduce the overcrowding. The law pardons prisoners under the age of 21 or over the age of 60; reduces felony sentences by one-third for all prisoners sentenced prior to August 2000; and pardons prisoners who are parents of minor children and have completed at least 50 percent of their sentences. (Reductions in felony sentences are not extended to prisoners convicted of murder, parricide, or treason, nor to most prisoners convicted of terrorism, rape, or narcotics trafficking. In addition, prisoners who were convicted of murder, rape, kidnaping, terrorism, or narcotics crimes and sentenced to more than 10 years in jail are not eligible for the benefits given to prisoners under age 21 or over age 60, or to parents of minor children.) The one-third reduction in sentences meant that many prisoners had served over 50 percent of their sentences and thus were eligible for earlier parole. The law was expected to lead to the release of between 1,500 and 2,000 prisoners by year's end; however, there was no information to confirm the number of actual releases.

A prisoner's wealth can determine cell size, visiting privileges, day-pass eligibility, and place or length of confinement. Cell prices range from $20 to $5,000 (130 to 32,500 bolivianos), paid to prior occupants or to prisoners who control cell blocks. For example, in the poorest parts of San Pedro prison in La Paz, inmates occupy tiny cells (3 by 4 by 6 feet) with no ventilation, lighting, or beds. Crowding in some "low-rent" sections obliges inmates to sleep sitting up. Although only children up to 6 years old are supposed to live with an incarcerated parent, children as old as age 12 live with their fathers in San Pedro prison. According to the Director General, as of April there were 1,624 children living with a parent in prison. If such children have nowhere else to go, the Government considers it more humane to support them in prison than to leave them homeless. According to a 1995 study, the standard prison diet can cause anemia; the diet has not been improved since then. Prisoners who can afford to supplement the standard prison diet by buying food do so. The Government budgets only $0.32 (2 bolivianos) per prisoner per day for food. There is no adequate health care within the prisons, and it is very difficult for prisoners to get permission for outside medical treatment. However, affluent prisoners can obtain transfers to preferred prisons or even to outside private institutional care for "medical" reasons. Drugs and alcohol are readily available for those inmates who can pay.

On March 8, convict Jose Valentin Mujica was found hanged at the maximum security San Pedro de Chonchocoro prison located near La Paz. On June 4, three prisoners were killed and three were injured at Palmasola prison in Santa Cruz as a result of violence between inmates. In June 2000, Brazilian prisoner Mustafa Samir was found hanged, and Peruvians Omar Casis and Renaldo Montesinos were shot and killed at the maximum security San Pedro de Chonchocoro prison located near La Paz, which houses the country's most violent prisoners and terrorists. Investigations into these deaths were pending at year's end.

On May 10, 2001, the Government inaugurated a new detention center in Chimore in the Chapare region built with assistance from an international donor. The new center, along with the adjoining old center that was refurbished, has a capacity to house 150 detainees, instead of only 50 previously. The changes also permitted the Government to segregate male and female prisoners. In June the Government inaugurated a new prison in Potosi designed to hold 300 prisoners.

There are separate prisons for women; conditions for female inmates are similar to those for men. However, the San Sebastian women's prison in Cochabamba is one of the most overcrowded prisons--overcrowding there is worse than in most prisons for men.

Convicted juvenile prisoners are not segregated from adult prisoners in jails. Rehabilitation programs for juveniles or other prisoners are scarce to nonexistent. The Government has acknowledged these problems but does not have sufficient resources to correct them quickly.

The Government permits prison visits by independent human rights monitors and news media representatives.

Violence against women is a pervasive problem, but no scheme exists to register such incidents systematically. According to the National Police's Department of Statistics and Planning, in 1998 approximately 57 percent of reported assaults were against women. According to a 1997-98 study conducted by the Pan-American Health Organization and the Ministry of Health among women in three municipalities representative of the country's three major cultural and geographic zones, 62 percent of women reported experiencing some kind of domestic violence or abuse at least once in their lifetime. Approximately 21 percent had suffered psychological abuse, 28 percent had suffered non-life-threatening physical violence, and 13 percent had suffered life-threatening violence. It is estimated that only one out of every five incidents of violence against women is reported.

The Family Violence Units of the police handle crimes of domestic violence and physical and/or sexual abuse against women and children.

Rape is also a serious problem that is highly underreported. The Law on Domestic and Family Violence makes the rape of an adult victim a public crime; however, the victim must press charges. The law also broadened the definition of family member abuse. The 1999 Law against Sexual Violation created the new crime of statutory rape of a person from 14 to 18 years of age and established new penalties: 10 to 20 years for the rape of a child under the age of 14; 2 to 6 years for statutory rape; and 5 to 20 years for the rape of an adult. The new Code of Criminal Procedures provides that crimes against adults included in previous laws on sex crimes can be made public crimes; however, the victim must press charges. Sexual crimes against minors automatically are considered public crimes. Public agencies state that reports of abuse have increased markedly as a result of these laws, as citizens have become more aware of the problem and of the availability of help.

Prostitution is legal for adults age 18 and older, and there were reports of trafficking in women for the purposes of prostitution and forced labor.

The new Code of Criminal Procedures for the first time considers sexual harassment a civil crime, also resulting in greater protection under the law. There are no statistics on the incidence of sexual harassment, but the problem generally is acknowledged to exist widely in the male-oriented society.

Legal services offices devoted to family and women's rights operate throughout the country. The Maternal and Infant Health Insurance Program provides health services, focused on maternal and infant health, to women of reproductive age and to children under the age of 5.

Women generally do not enjoy a social status equal to that of men. Many women do not know their legal rights. Traditional prejudices and social conditions remain obstacles to advancement. The Labor Code restricts the proportion of women staff in business to 45 percent of the workforce unless large groups of women are required in a particular enterprise; however, this restriction is not enforced actively. Women generally earn less than men for equal work; however, the minimum wage law treats men and women equally. Most women in urban areas work in the informal economy and the services and trade sectors, including domestic service and micro-business, whereas in rural areas the vast majority of economically active women work in agriculture. Young girls often leave school early to work at home or in the economy. According to a 1997 study by the Ministry of Education, four out of five illiterate citizens are female. Girls have lower rates of school participation and higher dropout rates than boys. Although not effectively enforced, the national labor law limits women to a workday 1 hour shorter than that of men and prohibits them from working at night.

The Government is aware of the precarious situation of children and the need to provide legal and institutional infrastructure for their protection. There are seven Defender of Children and Adolescents offices in La Paz to help protect children's rights and interests. However, the Government has not given the poor situation of children sufficient political priority to improve conditions quickly and effectively.

Although the law requires all children to complete at least 5 years of primary school, this requirement is enforced poorly, particularly in rural areas. The Ministry of Education and the World Bank estimated in 1997 that 26 percent of children graduated from high school. Prolonged teachers' strikes often result in lengthy school closures, limiting children's access to education.

The National Institute of Statistics calculated in 1998 that approximately 24 percent of children less than 3 years old were chronically undernourished. A 1999 UNICEF report on infant mortality indicated that 85 of every 1,000 children die before they reach 5 years of age. Many children, particularly from rural areas, lack the birth certificates and identity documents they need to secure social benefits and protection.

Physical and psychological abuse in the home also are serious problems. Corporal punishment and verbal abuse are common in schools.

Child prostitution is a problem, particularly in urban areas and in the Chapare region. At least two NGO's, Fundacion La Paz and Q'Haruru, have active programs to combat child prostitution. The Government's plan to combat child labor includes a campaign against child prostitution.

There were reports of children trafficked for forced labor to neighboring countries.

The 1999 Code for Boys, Girls, and Adolescents establishes, augments, and further safeguards the rights of children and adolescents. It also regulates adoptions and tightens protection against exploitative child labor and violence against children. However, resource constraints continue to impede full implementation of this law.

Children from 11 to 16 years of age can be detained indefinitely in children's centers for known or suspected offenses, or for their own protection, simply on the orders of a social worker.

Child labor is a problem. In April the Government's Inter-Institutional Commission for the Progressive Elimination of Child Labor formally released a finalized national plan to address the problem of child labor, which includes programs to address financial, health, education, and other needs of children.

The law prohibits trafficking in persons for the purpose of prostitution. There are no other laws that specifically address trafficking in persons, although many aspects of the problem are covered in other laws and in the Constitution. Trafficking in women and children is a problem.

In 2001, there were reports of domestic trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution. A union leader asserted that employment agencies lure rural indigenous women to cities with promises of employment as domestic servants but then force them to work without salaries to repay transport and other fees and sometimes turn them over to houses of prostitution.

There were credible reports that Bolivia is a country of origin for trafficked persons for forced labor in neighboring countries, especially Argentina, and to a lesser extent Chile and Brazil, although there are no reliable estimates available as to the extent of the problem. A small percentage of economic migrants receive fraudulent information about prospective jobs in neighboring countries, which turn out to be forced labor under harsh conditions. Some of the fraud leading to involuntary servitude originates within the country.

Women and adolescents, especially from indigenous ethnic groups in the altiplano (high plains) region, appear to be more at risk of being trafficked. Victims generally are trafficked to Argentina to work in agriculture, factories, trades, and as domestic employees; to Chile to work as domestic employees; and to Brazil to work in factories and as domestic employees.

The Government, including top immigration officials, does not facilitate, condone, or otherwise act complicitly in trafficking; however, individual low-ranking employees of various government agencies are known to take bribes to allow various types of smuggling, including contraband and persons. There also are allegations that Minor's Judges, who are responsible for issuing judicial orders that permit adolescents to travel alone, are receptive to bribes to facilitate the issuance of such orders.

The Immigration Service is primarily responsible for combating trafficking, with the assistance of the National Police when active law enforcement investigations are necessary. The Immigration Service has responsibility for all ports of entry/exit and border crossings. There is an interagency Minor's Committee formed to combat trafficking in adolescents for forced labor to neighboring countries. However, the Government lacks the resources necessary to address this problem to a greater extent.

The 1999 Law for the Protection of the Victims of Crimes Against Sexual Freedom specifically outlaws trafficking in persons for the purpose of prostitution and provides for sentences of up to 12 year's imprisonment. Heavier sentences are imposed if the victim is a minor. There are also laws prohibiting the falsification of government documents, such as passports, visas, and civil registry documents. In addition, the Penal Code prohibits slavery or an "analogous state," and it is punishable with 2 to 8 years of imprisonment. The Government also cooperates with other governments to investigate and prosecute trafficking cases. There were no known prosecutions during the year.

Bolivia is the third largest potential producer of cocaine in the world. The cocaine industry in Bolivia continues to be fragmented and dominated by small to mid-level trafficking organizations which manufacture, transport and/or distribute cocaine base in hundred to multi-hundred kilogram quantities per month. Most of the chemicals utilized in processing coca leaf into cocaine base and cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) are smuggled in from neighboring countries. Law enforcement successes in chemical seizures have caused cocaine producers to streamline the production process, reducing the need for certain expensive/difficult to obtain precursor chemicals, and recycling other essential chemicals. The result of these developments is a decrease in the purity of some Bolivian cocaine products, causing some Brazilian organizations to refine Bolivian base into HCl in Brazil rather than purchasing the finished product in Bolivia.

The Bolivian government (GOB) implemented its five-year counternarcotics plan early in 1998. As outlined in the plan, individual compensation for eradication was completely phased out. Most of the eradication achieved in 1998 was uncompensated and involuntary. Even so, the GOB achieved record levels of eradication, and a substantial reduction in the amount of coca under cultivation. Interdiction efforts were equally successful, with increases in arrests and in chemical seizures. Alternative development initiatives continue to provide licit alternatives to growing coca. The Bolivian legislature has passed into law three fourths of its judicial reform package, with only the code of criminal procedure awaiting action.

As of the end of 1998, there were approximately 38,000 hectares of coca under cultivation in Bolivia, a net reduction of 7,800 hectares (or 17 percent) from 1997 estimates. Of the total, there are 23,500 hectares in the Chapare, a net reduction of 25 percent in the region where the GOB has concentrated its eradication efforts. 14,200 in the Yungas, and 300 in other areas, most notably the Apolo region. Most newly planted coca in the Yungas can be attributed to coca growers planting new fields to replace those going out of production. However, as the amount of coca being produced in the Yungas exceeds the 12,000 hectares permitted by Bolivian law for legitimate consumption (and the 5,500 hectares a Bolivian Non-Government Organization (NGO) estimates are actually needed to meet legitimate uses), it is suspected by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) that much of the coca grown in the Yungas is being made into cocaine products. The GOB has not addressed the problem of excess cultivation in the Yungas. Almost all the coca grown in the Chapare goes to the illegal cocaine trade. The amount grown in Apolo and other regions is not significant, and there is no evidence it is being grown for other than traditional use by the indigenous population.

Few of the chemicals needed to process coca leaf into cocaine HCl are manufactured in Bolivia. Most are smuggled in from neighboring countries with more advanced chemical industries. It is estimated by DEA that only a small amount is being diverted by licensed importers. However, increased interdiction of chemicals, particularly in the Chapare raised the price of many smuggled chemicals. Bolivian lab operators are now using inferior substitutes (cement instead of lime, sodium bicarbonate for ammonia), recycled solvents (ether) and a streamlined production process which virtually eliminates the oxidation stage for producing cocaine base. Some laboratory operators are not using sulfuric acid during the maceration stage; consequently, less cocaine alkaloid is extracted from the leaf, producing less HCl. The lower quality of Bolivian cocaine has already begun to affect its marketability. Reportedly, some Brazilian organizations are purchasing only cocaine base from Bolivia and are refining their own cocaine HCl in Brazil.

The GOB adopted and implemented the country's first comprehensive counternarcotics strategy, the Dignity Plan, early in 1998. The plan consists of four "pillars." eradication, interdiction, alternative development and prevention. Its goal is to rid Bolivia of all excess coca by the year 2002. A combined military/police force sent to the Chapare in April to quell riots protesting implementation of the plan was converted into an eradication/security force which has since achieved record levels of eradication and has firmly established government control in the region for the first time. Even in the face of armed resistance, the GOB phased out individual compensation for eradication.

The GOB enacted three judicial reforms (the Judicial Council, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Constitutional Tribunal) which should help reduce the backlog of cases awaiting consideration by the Supreme Court, provide a less political process for the selection of judges, establish an alternative and more efficient mechanism for the investigation of judicial corruption and make the justice system more accessible. A fourth bill, a new Code of Criminal Procedure, is being debated in the Senate and may be amended to include desirable key reforms left out by the Chamber of Deputies. The use of undercover agents and informants, controlled deliveries, plea bargaining, and in rem asset seizure and forfeiture. The final bill may also include a stronger conspiracy law. Bolivia's 1996 anti-money laundering law has not been enforced, although a director for the Financial Investigations Unit of the Superintendency of Banks was named in 1998.

A fixed and roving checkpoint program, special intelligence/operations units focusing on both narcotics and essential chemicals and other investigative efforts have resulted in increases from FY1997 totals in all quantitative categories. Arrests are up by 42 percent, chemical seizures by 13 percent, and drug seizures by one percent.

Total cultivation of coca in Bolivia was 38,000 hectares at the end of 1998, 7,800 less than a year earlier. Of the total, 28,600 hectares were of mature, harvestable coca, an 18 percent reduction from the previous year. During 1998, 11,621 hectares were eradicated, while only 3,820 hectares of new coca were planted.

One hectare of Chapare coca yields an average of 2.7 metric tons of sun-dried coca leaf, which produces about 7.44 kilograms of cocaine. The eradication of 11,621 hectares of Chapare coca during this year prevented approximately 85 metric tons of cocaine from being produced and exported to the United States and other destinations. This represents a fifth consecutive year of decline in potential cocaine production and a decrease from 200 metric tons in 1997 to 150 metric tons in 1998. Moreover, the decline of new coca planted and the destruction of some 68,578 square meters of seedbeds ensures this trend will continue if the GOB's aggressive eradication effort is sustained in 1999.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provides core support for the GOB's alternative development activities--consolidating the agriculture and infrastructure network, enabling farmers to support themselves and their families without the need to cultivate coca. INL-funded, USAID-supported organizations are contributing to net coca reduction by providing alternative development assistance to those communities and farmer organizations that are willing to eliminate all of their coca or had all of their coca forcibly eradicated. The success of the GOB's alternative development program has enabled 73 Chapare communities and producer associations to sign coca eradication agreements with Bolivia's eradication agency (DIREC0) from July 1997 to October 1998.

Licit production of commercially viable crops in the Chapare has increased from about 40,613 hectares in 1986 to approximately 105,000 hectares in 1998 (a 159 percent improvement)--three times greater than Chapare coca cultivation. Total farmgate sales of the five priority crops promoted by USAID (bananas, pineapples, palm hearts, black pepper and passion fruit) increased by 55 percent in the third quarter of CY98 compared with the same quarter in CY97, while farmers' net income from those crops increased by 52 percent over the same period. More than ever, these results show that alternative development is increasingly enabling the GOB to undertake aggressive eradication campaigns while maintaining public support for those efforts.

However, the demand for alternative development exceeds the ability of the GOB to meet it. With the elimination of individual compensation for eradication, the GOB has not developed a comprehensive plan for addressing community-based needs. Considerable resources have already been provided for infrastructure improvements; therefore, these types of projects will be increasingly difficult to offer as compensation packages for voluntary eradication. Furthermore, upwards of 20,000 miners-turned-coca growers do not want to become traditional farmers, so job training and possible resettlement into areas of Bolivia where employment is available may be necessary.

Compiled and edited by Jill Torres